Like those famous nations divided by a single tongue, my paper (this volume) and Professor P.M. Churchland's deep and engaging reply offer different spins on a common heritage. The common heritage is, of course, a connectionist vision of the inner neural economy-a vision which depicts that economy in terms of supra-sentential state spaces, vector-to-vector transformations, and the kinds of skillful pattern-recognition routine we share with the bulk of terrestrial intelligent life-forms. That which divides us is, as ever, much harder to isolate and name. Clearly, it has something to do with the role of moral talk and exchange, and something to do with the conception of morality itself (and, correlatively, with the conception of moral progress). Most of this Reply will be devoted to clarifying the nature of the disputed territory.
rules, maxims and guidelines (even God's own moral rules, maxims and guidelines, were God forced to formulate them as sentences in some Earthly tongue) are not to be viewed as displaying the full, rich content of our own (or God's) achieved moral expertise. Instead, the rules, maxims and guidelines play a kind of facilitating role. They act as reference points for collaborative moral reasoning and discussion, and they sow the seeds for deeper and more penetrating moral thought (for example, by providing summary labels which can support the discovery of deeper, more abstract, otherwise cognitively invisible, moral concepts-as per the discussion of pan troglodytes in my text). And we agree, finally (though here I suspect I was not clear in the text) that there can be, and indeed has been, genuine moral progress. I concur wholeheartedly with professor Churchland's forceful description of the many moral mistakes and attitudes enshrined in the Bible and believe, as he does, that many contemporary moral norms represent substantial advances over that primitive foray into moral space.
Where, then, do we disagree? We disagree, I suggest, on two (related) counts.
First, we disagree on the precise role of all that external scaffolding and moral infrastructure. As Professor Churchland _as it, the role of the scaffolding is largely to offload, preserve, stockpile and share our collective moral wisdom and experience. And moral wisdom itself is conceived as a kind of know-how concerning the successful navigation of social space, a type of know-how we thus share with many other social animals including "baboon troops, wolf packs, dolphin schools, chimpanzee groups, lion prides". What we find in such cases, Churchland suggests, is "the same complex ebb and flow of thoughtful sharing, mutual defense, fair competition, familial sacrifice, staunch alliance, minor deception, major treachery, and the occasional outright ostracism that we see displayed in human societies."
What we do not find, he notes, is the peculiar kind of discursive language-use or highly articulated non-biological infrastructure that characterizes human societies. As a result, in the case of other social animals "their social cognition is conducted entirely within the more primitive and nondiscursive form of cognition". The specific social spaces we might navigate are, Churchland allows, deeply transformed by these extra layers of infrastructure. But the discursive infrastructures, Churchland insists, "do not bring moral reasoning into existence for the first time, and they do not provide a conceptual model remotely adequate to the phenomenon of moral cognition in single individuals and nonhuman animals" Moral understanding, it seems, is a more primitive thing.
Here, then, is the first point of real disagreement. For on my account, our practices of moral talk and exchange, and our collective efforts to create the kinds of abstract, shared conceptions (of 'charity' 'rights' 'equality' 'opportunity' etc.) that such discussions require are part of what constitutes our practices as genuinely moral in the first place. I do not dispute, in any way, Professor Churchland's depiction of nonlinguistic animals as navigating social spaces. But I do dispute the apparent direct assimilation of such skilled navigation to moral activity. There is, I maintain, a sufficiently profound difference between our human moral projects and the project of successful social navigation to justify treating the latter, but not the former, as distinctively moral modes of thought and reason. Such modes are marked, for example, by the requirement to provide reasons for our actions, and to be able to address the important question of the acceptability, or otherwise, of our own underlying needs, desires and goals. They are marked also, I argued, by an essential commitment to collaborative moral endeavor: to finding routes through moral space that accommodate multiple perspectives and points of view. Practices of public moral discussion and exchange creates, I tried to argue, these kinds of moral sensitivity in much the same way as the creation of financial institutions creates the space to trade in stocks, shares, options and futures, then options on futures, and so on. In each case the presence of the infrastructure is partly constitutive of the very possibility of the target phenomenon.
In weak support of this rather strong thesis (the thesis, if you like, of the discursive construction of moral space) I offered a couple of more detailed-but admittedly non-moral-exemplars. One Dennett (1996) ),tend to underestimate just how very special we humans are. This downplaying is doubtless the result of an otherwise laudable desire to keep things natural and to emphasize the deep and real continuities between human cognition and that of other animals. But we are different, and the difference is cognitively deep (even if rooted in only some small neural difference). To appreciate the difference we must abandon our staunchly brain-and-individual oriented stance, and attend equally to the potent cognitive transformations effected by the matrix of words and technologies in which we live and think.
Common ground thus marked, and disputed territory highlighted, what is to be done? Here, I confess, I am at something of a loss. For all I have done, on reflection, is to present a personal, biased picture of in what moral cognition might consist, and to accompany this picture with a couple of (notably non-moral) illustrations. The picture is one in which the moral realm comes into view, and moral cognition is partially constituted, only by the joint action of neural resources we share with other animals and the distinctively human infrastructure of linguaform moral debate and reason.
Our status as moral agents depends crucially, if I am right, on the many additional layers of cognitive circuitry we have slowly woven into the worlds within which we now think, reason, act, build and legislate. But Professor Churchland's vision, so wonderfully expressed and powerfully argued in his contribution, stands out as clear and compelling. The moral realm, as he depicts it, is one already explored by many social animals, and is not at all the peculiar province of the language-and-culture enhanced ('mindware upgraded'-see Clark, In Press) human species.
Who (if either) is right? And how can we tell? My closing thought is that this is, in all likelihood, not exactly an empirical question. The answer depends upon some hard decisions concerning which aspects of current moral practice should be foregrounded in our best philosophical and scientific treatments of morality. And that, I venture to suggest, may be a moral, rather than a properly scientific, question.
